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KEEPING KIDS FIRST: TRIAL COURT DISCRETION
AND THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD IN LIGHT
V. D’AMATO
Stanley W. Abraham*
I. INTRODUCTION
Family dissolution is a difficult ordeal for everyone involved: the parties, their
lawyers, and the court. After all, these are not parties engaged in an arm’s length
dealing, or strangers involved in an accident. On the contrary, the parties are
generally intimately involved and often share property and children. Spouses
frequently struggle to agree on even the most trivial of property divisions, with the
ownership of a simple rocking chair a potential issue for appeal.1
As contentious as such property division disputes can be, disputes between
divorcing parents regarding the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities are
particularly bitter.2 Most parents recognize, at least in the abstract, what the Maine
Legislature demands: children do best when allowed to benefit from the affection
and support of both parents.3 Nonetheless, each parent generally wants to spend as
much time with his or her child as possible, and any time gained comes at the expense
of the other parent.
This Solomon’s Dilemma4 is aggravated when one parent wishes to relocate.
Residency becomes even more important to both sides when visitation will be
impinged by geographical distance.5 A parent may have legitimate reasons for
relocation: to benefit from the support of family, to start new employment, or even
simply to get a fresh start. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that the Constitution guarantees an individual’s right to relocate.6
In 2014, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, heard an
appeal in Light v. D’Amato, a highly contentious divorce case in which residency and
relocation were at issue.7 The District Court included a conditional provision (“the
Provision”) in the divorce judgment granting primary residency to Paola D’Amato,
the child’s mother, but with residency to automatically transfer to the father, Peter

* J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Maine School of Law. The Notator thanks Professor Deirdre
Smith for her helpful guidance and insight.
1. See Young v. Young, 2015 ME 89, ¶ 15, 120 A.3d 106.
2. For the sake of convenience, this Note refers to divorcing parents; however, the analysis and
conclusions are also applicable when the parents are unmarried. See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1503 (2012) (“A
child born out of wedlock is the child of that child's biological parents and is entitled to the same legal
rights as a child born in lawful wedlock. . . .”).
3. See 19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1651, 1653 (2012).
4. Two women came before King Solomon, each arguing that a certain child was hers. 1 Kings
3:16-28. “Then the king said, ‘Bring me a sword.’ So they brought a sword for the king. He then gave
an order: ‘Cut the living child in two and give half to one and half to the other.’” Id. The child’s mother
spoke up, requesting the child be given to the other woman rather than be slain. Id.
5. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.17 cmt. e (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
6. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).
7. Light v. D’Amato, 2014 ME 134, 105 A.3d 447.
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Light, were D’Amato to relocate to Italy, her country of origin.8 D’Amato appealed
the Provision as unconstitutionally interfering with her right to travel.9
The Law Court held that the Provision imposed no constraint on D’Amato’s
freedom to travel.10 Furthermore, the court held that any collateral effect on
D’Amato’s freedom to travel was balanced by “various fundamental or
constitutionally protected interests.”11 This Note critiques the Law Court’s holding
that conditional grants of residency, like that in the Provision, do not constrain a
parent’s freedom to travel. It will also argue that the Law Court should have
recognized the best interest of the child as a compelling state interest sufficient to
constrain a parent’s right to relocate, rather than adopting an amorphous balancing
test that family courts will struggle to implement.
In Part II, this Note will provide the legal background for parental relocation
cases, including the statutory framework for determining parental rights and
responsibilities and the constitutionally protected right to travel and relocate. This
discussion will conclude by proposing that the best interest of the child should be
determinative when parental relocation is at issue. In Part III, this Note will discuss
the factual and procedural background of Light as well as the court’s holding and
reasoning. Part IV begins by analyzing two cases preceding Light in which
conditional grants of residency were appealed, and concludes by arguing that the best
interest of the child is of paramount importance, that protecting that interest should
be determinative in future cases where parental relocation is at issue, and should be
the standard by which future conditional grants of residency are analyzed.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Parental Rights and Responsibilities, Residency, and the Best Interest of
the Child
It is well-documented that divorce can pose significant challenges to the minor
children of the marriage.12 Maine, like other jurisdictions, attempts to mitigate these
challenges through procedural and statutory requirements. Recognizing that conflict
between parents only exacerbates the adverse impact on their children, Maine law
imposes certain requirements on trial courts and parties to encourage resolution
through agreement. These include case management conferences, mediation, status
conferences, and pre-trial hearings before a contested hearing is scheduled.13
Generally, the court must respect the parents’ agreement, barring “substantial
evidence that it should not be ordered.”14 Whether by agreement or order, a divorce
judgment will include a determination of parental rights and responsibilities—

8. Id. ¶ 11.
9. Id. ¶ 17.
10. Id. ¶ 19.
11. Id. ¶ 20.
12. Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children's Best Interests in Relocation Cases: Burgess
Revisited, 34 FAM. L.Q. 83, 110 (2000). (“Children's feelings of loss or satisfaction . . . are important for
anyone concerned about their welfare, including courts.”).
13. 19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 251, 1653(11) (2012).
14. Id. § 1653(2)(A).
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including primary physical residence, parental-child contact and child support.15
When the parents fail to reach an agreement, Maine law provides that, “[t]he
court, in making an award of parental rights and responsibilities with respect to a
child, shall apply the standard of the best interest of the child.”16 Maine’s “Best
Interest of the Child” standard includes nineteen factors that the court must consider
in making such a determination.17 These factors track the findings the Legislature
set out in the parental rights and responsibilities18 statute: that the public policy of
the state is to ensure frequent and continuing contact with both parents,19 except
where the court finds that such an arrangement is not in the best of interest of the
child.20 In practice, the limiting factor for the court in applying these standards is
often simply logistics, such as transportation and work or school schedules.21
B. Parental Relocation: Squaring the Circle
1.

The Problem in Focus

The right to move amongst the states is protected by the Constitution, and
recognized as a fundamental right by the Supreme Court.22 While never explicitly

15. In Maine, “residence” and “contact” are used in place of the traditional terms of “custody” and
“visitation,” respectively. This Note will use the Maine vocabulary. Id. § 1653(2)(D)(1).
16. Id. § 1653(3).
17. These factors are broad in scope, including fairly obvious factual considerations such as the
existence of domestic abuse and less intuitive, more subjective considerations such as the ability of either
parent to facilitate coparenting. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(3)(H-I), (L-M) (2014). While the trial court must
consider the statutory best interest factors, it is not required to make detailed findings regarding each one.
Aranovitch v. Versel, 2015 ME 146, ¶ 19, 127 A.3d 542.
18. Id. § 1653(1)(C); see also 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1651 (2012) (“The father and mother are the joint
natural guardians of their minor children and are jointly entitled to the care, custody, control, services and
earnings of their children. Neither parent has any rights paramount to the rights of the other with reference
to any matter affecting their children.”).
19. In a recent family law appeal, the Law Court expressed in dicta that it was “dismayed . . . that, in
nearly two years, [a] child had no visits with his father at his father's residence.” Desmond v. Desmond,
2011 ME 57, ¶ 6, 17 A.3d 1234.
20. See, e.g., 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(1)(B) (2012) (recognizing domestic abuse as a serious crime
“creating an atmosphere that is not conducive to childhood development”); § 1653(3)(L)-(M) (listing
existence of domestic abuse or child abuse as factors to be considered in determining the best interest of
the child).
21. One need only read a typical order, or sit in at any family law hearing, to appreciate how much
effort goes into merely working around busy schedules and providing for transportation. See, e.g., Brasier
v. Preble, 2013 ME 109, ¶ 7, 82 A.3d 841 (“the eight-month interval without visits [with the father] was
due to Vanessa's schedule and her lack of money for gas and fares for the ferry . . . He then saw the children
for a day and a half . . . but had to send them back to Vanessa because she wanted to take them to a movie
at the library and their son had karate practice.”).
22. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941) (“The right to move freely from State to State
is an incident of national citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment against state interference[.]”); see also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958) (“The right
to travel is part of the ‘liberty’ of which the citizen cannot be deprived without the due process of law
under the Fifth Amendment.”); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (“The constitutional right
to travel from one State to another has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized . . . This
constitutional right . . . of course, includes the right of entering and abiding in any state in the Union[.]”)
(citations omitted). But see Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418-419 (upholding a fundamental right to
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mentioned in the Constitution, the Court described the right to move about the
country as recognized “before the Fourteenth Amendment . . . as a right fundamental
to the national character of our Federal government.”23 Furthermore, the right is not
limited to mere travel through the states, but includes the concurrent right to settle
permanently therein.24
Relocation incident to divorce is not uncommon.25 Indeed, it frequently is a
logical development following the divorce: Either party may wish to return home to
enjoy the support of family, seek employment, join a new partner, or make a fresh
start.26 The Supreme Court, to the extent it recognizes a fundamental right to settle
where one chooses, protects that right.27 In other words, in the absence of some
competing fundamental right or compelling government interest, the constitutionally
protected right to relocate would control relocation incident to divorce in favor of
the relocating parent. However, each parent likewise has a right to raise his or her
child.28 In Maine, both parents are recognized as the natural guardians of their child29
and the court “may not apply a preference for one parent over the other” in
determining residency.30 If one parent, who has been granted primary residency,
wishes to move to a distant state, the right of the other parent to raise his or her child
has been compromised.31 Conversely, prohibiting the parent from relocating restricts
his or her fundamental right to relocate. Family matter appeals in the state appellate
courts are rife with dicta commenting on the difficulty of the problem.32 The
“solution” proposed by some courts that have forbade residential parents from
moving with their child is that such orders may not prohibit the residential parent
from moving but merely from moving with their child.33 In other words, losing
primary residency is only a factor to be considered by the relocating parent in their

relocate amongst the States but recognizing that there are “situations in which a State may prevent a citizen
from leaving.”) (1981).
23. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 178.
24. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) (“The ‘right to travel’ . . . protects . . . for those travelers
who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.”).
25. PRINCIPLES § 2.17, cmt. a at 402 (2002) (“The relocation of a parent, or both parents, is a
circumstance that frequently follows divorce.”).
26. See id., § 2.17(a)(ii) (2002) for a list of widely recognized valid purposes for parental relocation.
27. See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 178.
28. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (holding that a parent has a fundamental interest in the
companionship, care, and management of his or her children).
29. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1651 (2012 & Supp. 2015).
30. Id. § 1653(4).
31. Or, perhaps, to an island accessible only by ferry. See Braiser v. Preble, 2013 ME 109, ¶ 5, 82
A.3d 841.
32. See, e.g., Tropea v. Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 148 (N.Y. 1996) (“Relocation cases such as the two
before us present some of the knottiest and most disturbing problems that our courts are called upon to
resolve.”); Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 333 (Tenn. 1993).
33. See Carlson v. Carlson, 661 P.2d 833, 836 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that mother’s right to
establish residence elsewhere was limited only by her desire to maintain primary residency with her
child.). But see Taylor, 849 S.W.2d at 333 (recognizing that an order compelling a mother to remain in
Memphis or give up primary residency presented her with “a veritable Hobson's choice” that was legally
inappropriate).
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decision to leave or stay.34
2.

The Best Interest of the Child as a Solution

In order to balance the competing interests of moving and nonmoving parents,
most jurisdictions now allow residential parents to move with their child only if
certain factors have been met.35 Generally, these factors track consistently with The
Principles of the Law on Family Dissolution (“Principles”), which provides that
courts “should allow a parent who has been exercising the clear majority of custodial
responsibility to relocate with the child if that parent shows that the relocation is for
a valid purpose, in good faith, and to a location that is reasonable in light of the
purpose.”36 The “reasonable location” factor is the requirement implicated by
interstate relocation, or, for that matter, intercontinental relocation.37
Determining whether relocation is valid and reasonable is a fact-intensive
inquiry, and as such, trial courts are generally allowed broad discretion.38 This holds
true in Maine, where parental relocation cases are reviewed for abuse of discretion.39
The standard is recited as particularly strict, as “an abuse of discretion will only be
found if the award is ‘plainly and unmistakably an injustice that is so apparent as to
be instantly visible without argument.’”40 An important factor to be considered is
whether the relocation will be in the best interest of the child.41
Although the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution guarantees a
fundamental right to relocate, even fundamental rights can be abridged provided
there is a compelling state interest.42 Several states have recognized that protecting
the best interests of a child is a compelling state interest.43 In fact, over the last
34. See Light v. D’Amato, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 19, 105 A.3d 447 (“The court's decision might affect
D'Amato's decision-making, but it does not impair her right to travel and settle in whatever location she
chooses.”).
35. See Rowland v. Kingman, 629 A.2d 613, 615 (Me. 1993) (describing parental relocation as a
change in circumstances bearing on the best interest of the child); see also Arnott v. Arnott, 293 P.3d 440,
458 (Wyo. 2012) (listing factors to be considered, including the “state’s paramount concern for promoting
the best interests of the children.”).
36. PRINCIPLES § 2.17(a) (2002).
37. If a parent moves within the same town, or only a few miles away, such relocation would almost
always be considered reasonable. Contact with the non-residential parent will be easier to ensure. Indeed,
the Law Court has not yet considered an appeal where the issue was a primary residential parent moving
within the same city or county, or even within the state of Maine.
38. E.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 334 (Tenn. 1993) (O’Brien, J., dissenting) (“[S]uch
decisions are primarily factual, not legal.”).
39. Smith v. Padolko, 2008 ME 56, ¶¶ 15-16, 955 A.2d 740.
40. Id. ¶ 9 (quoting JON D. LEVY, MAINE FAMILY LAW PLEADINGS AND PROCEDURE § 4.13.3 at 61
(5th ed. 2010)); see also infra note 104 and accompanying text.
41. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653. (2012 & Supp. 2015); see also Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 22, 105 A.3d 447;
Malenko v. Handrahan, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 23, 979 A.2d 1269; Rowland, 629 A.2d at 616-17.
42. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).
43. See, e.g., LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 163 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the
best interest of the child is a compelling interest sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny); In re Custody of
D.M.G. and T.J.G., 951 P.2d 1377 (Mont. 1998) (holding that constitutional right to interstate travel is
“qualified” by the best interests of the child). But see Clark v. Atkins, 489 N.E.2d 90, 99-100 (Ind.Ct.App.
1986) (recognizing protecting the interests of children as a “compelling objective” but also holding that
an order requiring the mother to return to Indiana from Oklahoma upon finishing schooling “does not
impose any necessary burden whatever upon her right to travel.”) (emphasis in original).
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several years, at least two states with a contrary rule have changed course and now
also recognize the best interest of the child as a compelling state interest sufficient
to overcome a parent’s right to relocate.44
Such a finding is not inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent,45 nor Law
Court precedent46 narrowly holding that the best interest of the child standard cannot
be a compelling interest overriding a parent’s fundamental right as natural guardian
to their child as it relates to third parties.47 In the case of distant parental relocation,
to the extent that either parent’s fundamental right to rear their child is infringed, it
is to the benefit of the other parent. The best interest of the child can be a logical
tiebreaker under such circumstances. Although the Supreme Court has consistently
held that a “compelling interest” must be compelling indeed,48 the best interest of
children should meet this test, particularly with an intractable issue such as parental
relocation.
III. LIGHT V. D’AMATO
A. Factual Background
Paola D’Amato and Peter Light were married in Maine in 2000.49 Their one
daughter was born in July 2005.50 Light filed for divorce in February 2012, and the
Portland District Court held a four-day trial in July 2013. The trial court entered a
divorce judgment in December of that same year.51 While D’Amato had primary
physical residency during the pendency of the divorce, both parents maintained a
positive relationship with their daughter.52 The court found that the young girl’s best
interest would be served by maintaining primary physical residence with D’Amato.53
The primary residency provision of the judgment was complicated by
D’Amato’s desire to return to Italy, where she was born and had significant family
support.54 Consistent with Maine law,55 the court found that the “child’s best interest
[would be] served by having continued, regular contact with both parents.”56 An
44. See Baxendale v. Raich, 878 N.E.2d 1252 (Ind. 2008) rev’g Clark v. Atkins, 489 N.E.2d 90 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1986) (“[T]he child's interests are powerful countervailing considerations that cannot be swept
aside as irrelevant in the face of a parent's claimed right to relocate.”); see also Arnott v. Arnott, 293 P.3d
440, 458 (Wyo. 2012) (overruling Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999)).
45. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
46. Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 12, 761 A.2d 291.
47. In Rideout, the Law Court did hold that “the best interests of the child standard, standing alone,
is an insufficient standard for determining when the State may intervene in the decision making of
competent parents.” 2000 ME 198, ¶ 12, 761 A.2d 291. Nonetheless, the court upheld a state statute
allowing for rights of visitation for grandparents under specific circumstances and procedural safeguards.
Id. ¶ 33; see also 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1801 (2012) et seq.
48. See, e.g., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (“[I]f ‘compelling
interest’ really means what it says . . . many laws will not meet the test.”).
49. Light v. D’Amato, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 2, 105 A.3d 447.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. ¶¶ 5-8.
53. Id. ¶ 9.
54. Id. ¶ 8.
55. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653 (2012).
56. Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 24, 105 A.3d 447.
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intercontinental move would complicate this goal, and the court found that in the
event of a geographical separation, Light would be more likely to foster contact with
D’Amato than D’Amato would be if she were to take the child to Italy.57 As such,
the court found that the best interest of the child would be served by granting
D’Amato primary physical residency only so long as she stayed in Maine.58 If she
moved to Italy, then residency would automatically switch to Light.59
B. No Limitation on the Mother’s Right to Travel
D’Amato appealed inter alia the conditional grant of residency on the grounds
that it “unconstitutionally interfered with her right to travel.”60 On appeal, the Law
Court upheld the Provision.61 The court found no constraint on D’Amato’s freedom
to travel to Italy and relocate there.62 The Law Court explained that the District
Court’s decision “might affect D’Amato’s decision-making, but it does not impair
her right to travel and settle in whatever location she chooses.”63 In other words, the
Provision does not constrain D’Amato’s right to travel because it does not prohibit
her from leaving: she merely forfeits primary physical residency if she does so, and
this forfeiture is simply a factor for her to consider in choosing whether to leave.64
The Court reached the issue over the concurrence’s argument that the issue was
moot. 65 Because D’Amato had, in fact, not moved to Italy, the Provision’s condition
was never met. By the time the appeal was decided, the “imminence” window of the
relocation had closed, and the only procedural option for a new order regarding
residency would be through a motion to modify pursuant to title 19-A, section 1657
of the Maine Revised Statutes.66 It is perhaps because it was the second time in five
years that the Court had to consider a conditional grant of primary residency that the
Court “reached” the issue to provide guidance to family law courts when confronting
these cases.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Setting the Stage: Malenko and Rowland
Since the late 1990s, Light v. D’Amato was the third appeal of a conditional grant
of residency heard by the Law Court.67 In each of these cases, the divorce judgment
was upheld, but the constitutionality of the conditional grant of residency was never
57. Id.
58. Id. ¶ 9.
59. Id. ¶ 10. See also id. at ¶ 32 (Hjelm, J., concurring) (for the full text of the Provision).
60. Id. ¶ 17.
61. Id. ¶ 25. The Court reached the issue over the concurrence’s argument that as in Malenko, the
issue was moot. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
62. See Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 19, 105 A.3d 447.
63. Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 19, 105 A.3d 447.
64. See Carlson v. Carlson, 661 P.2d 833, 836 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983)
65. See Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 25, 105 A.3d 447.
66. Id. ¶ 31 (Hjelm, J., concurring).
67. See Malenko v. Handrahan, 2009 ME 96, 979 A.2d 1269; Rowland v. Kingman, 1997 ME 80,
692 A.2d 939 [hereinafter Rowland II]; Rowland v. Kingman, 629 A.2d 613 (Me. 1993) [hereinafter
Rowland I].
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considered. Nonetheless, the Law Court discussed the constitutionality and statutory
validity of those provisions in detail in dicta. In all three cases, the court’s treatment
of the conditional grants of residency was favorable, based largely on the District
Court’s finding that such provisions were in the best interest of the child.
1.

Rowland v. Kingman

The court confronted a conditional grant of primary physical residency in both
Rowland I68 and Rowland II.69 Rowland I involved a relocation provision that
automatically transferred primary residency from the father to the mother if the
mother were to move out of state.70 Because Rowland, the appellant, failed to raise
a constitutional challenge at trial, neither case presented the Law Court with the
opportunity to consider that issue.71 The relocation provision was the result of a
motion to modify the original order brought by the father in response to the mother’s
plan to move to Oregon.72 The Law Court upheld that provision, holding that such
action was consistent with the best interest of the two children.73 Nonetheless, in
defiance of the order, the mother moved the children to Oregon, causing the father
to travel to Oregon to bring the children back to Maine.74 The mother then moved
back to Maine in order to retain primary physical residency of her children.75 This
was not the end of the matter. In 1994, Rowland brought her own modification
motion, seeking permission to move to Oregon with the two children.76 Her motion
was granted, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal.77
These results may seem inconsistent, but can be reconciled with a mind to
procedure. Decisions relating to the parental rights and responsibilities are governed
by the best interest of the child at the time that they are contested: they are not subject
to the doctrine of res judicata, or “final judgment rule.”78 Provided that the moving
party can demonstrate sufficiently changed circumstances by a preponderance of the
evidence, and that the best interests of the child will be served by a modification to
the existing order, any prior modifications are not necessarily controlling.79 Perhaps
68. Rowland I, 629 A.2d 613.
69. Rowland II, 1997 ME 80, 692 A.2d 939.
70. Rowland I, 629 A.2d 613 at 615.
71. Id. at n.1 (citing Morris v. Resolution Trust Co., 622 A.2d 708, 712 n.2 (Me. 1993)).
72. Id. at 615.
73. Id. at 616.
74. Id. at n.3.
75. See Rowland II, 1997 ME 80, ¶ 2, 692 A.2d 939 (“Both parties presently reside in Yarmouth.”).
Rowland did not raise the constitutional and statutory issues raised by D’Amato until the appeal, and as
such the Court did not consider these issues. Rowland I, 629 A.2d at 615 n.1. Thus the issue was not
settled by the time Handrahan brought her appeal, and because the Law Court declined to resolve it in her
case due to mootness, the issue remained unresolved in Maine. See infra Part IV. A. 2.
76. Rowland II, 1997 ME 80, ¶ 3, 692 A.2d 939.
77. Id. ¶ 1.
78. Id. ¶ 3. Hence Handrahan’s contention that the Provision violated title 19-A, section 1653 of the
Maine Revised Statutes because it “determin[ed] the daughter’s best interests prospectively and [was]
temporally indefinite,” a contention without merit once Malenko conceded that the Provision’s condition
was only effective as of the date the judgment was issued. Malenko v. Handrahan, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 20, 979
A.2d 1269; see infra Part IV.A.2.
79. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1657 (2012 & Supp. 2015); see also Rowland II, 1997 ME 80, ¶ 4, 692 A.2d
939 (“[T]he burden [is] placed on the moving party to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that,
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harder to reconcile from an ethical perspective is the mother’s disregard for the order
in Rowland I. But it is important to keep in mind that the role of the court in family
matters is to protect the interests of the child, and not to punish parents for acting
badly.80 Revoking a parent’s primary physical residency will be just as traumatic for
the child regardless of whether the parent and child have been living in a location
condoned by the court order.
A final note on the Rowland cases is their implicit support for the primacy of the
best interest of the child in determining residency. As noted by the dissent, the
judgment in Rowland I yielded an interesting result where the children were to
maintain a residence in the town in which they had been living, despite the fact that
neither parent wanted to reside there.81 The best interest of the child in this case,
then, was not even a tie-breaker between the competing interests of two parents, but
effectively held to supersede both.
2.

Malenko v. Handrahan

Lori Handrahan and Igor Malenko met in Macedonia in 2005 and lived in
Holland until early 2006, when they moved to the United States and married.82 Their
daughter was born later that year.83 In May 2008, Malenko filed for divorce.84 A
final hearing was held in December 2008.85 The issue of parental rights and
responsibilities relating to the child was hotly contested. Handrahan alleged that
Malenko was mentally ill, violent, and abusive, and as such posed a significant risk
to their daughter.86
The trial court did not find Handrahan’s allegations of abuse and mental illness
credible.87 This finding was supported by the guardian ad litem’s report88 and the
since the prior custody order, there has occurred a change in circumstances sufficiently substantial in its
effect on the best interests of the children to justify a modification . . . .”).
80. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653 (2012 & Supp. 2015). For an extreme example, see Stacey-Sotiriou v.
Sotiriou, 2014 ME 145, ¶ 15, 106 A.3d 417 (“[The] focus [is] not on the past acts of the parents, but on
what, going forward, would be in the best interest of the child . . . [T]he court [must] ‘make a close
examination of the present circumstances and future needs of a minor child, and not just a limited
examination of which parent is better suited to accept physical custody.’”) (quoting the district court
opinion).
81. Rowland I, 629 A.2d 613, 617 (Me. 1993) (Clifford, J., dissenting).
82. Malenko, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 2, 979 A.2d 1269.
83. Id.
84. Id. ¶ 4.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. ¶ 15.
88. The guardian’s report highlighted some of the conflict in Malenko and Handrahan’s marriage:
[T]he guardian concluded that the episodes of domestic violence were attributable to
“situational couple violence” arising from conflicts in the marriage, as opposed to
“coercive controlling violence,” which is characterized by power and control and often
results in serious injuries. She wrote: “While I do not believe Lori is being intentionally
misleading, I believe that her experience and perceptions are not the experience and
perceptions that others may have of the same event.” The guardian also observed, “This is
not a typical domestic violence situation, in that the person with the power and control in
the relationship was clearly [Handrahan, and that h]er actions in this case are not consistent
with those of a battered wife.”
Id. ¶ 11.
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testimony of Dr. Carol Lynn Kabacoff, a clinical psychologist, who evaluated both
parents at the request of the guardian ad litem.89 Nonetheless, the court ordered
shared parental rights and responsibilities and granted primary physical residency to
Handrahan, with rights of parental contact granted to Malenko on a graduated
schedule.90 This was consistent with the recommendation of the guardian ad litem
that such an order would be in the best interest of the child, despite certain
reservations based on Handrahan’s pattern of behavior.91 In particular, the guardian
was concerned that Handrahan would be unwilling to foster a relationship between
her daughter and Malenko.92 Sometime after this report was written, the guardian
learned that Handrahan planned to relocate to Washington, D.C.93 Based on this new
information, the guardian wrote a second report concluding that primary physical
residency should be granted to Malenko if Handrahan relocated.94 This revised
recommendation was a logical extension of her anxieties from the first order—if
Handrahan was unlikely to foster a relationship between her daughter and Malenko
while they were living in the same state, a distant relocation would “effectively sever
the child’s relationship with her father.”95
The trial court took the guardian’s recommendation: primary physical residence
was allocated to Handrahan, but this grant was conditional on Handrahan’s
remaining in Maine.96 However, if Handrahan were to relocate out of state, primary
physical residence would be granted to Malenko.97
On appeal, Handrahan contended the Provision was unconstitutional and
violated title 19-A, section 1653 of the Maine Revised Statutes, specifically because
it “determin[ed] the daughter’s best interests prospectively and [was] temporally
indefinite.”98 The grounds for the constitutional violation largely track the discussion
89. Id. ¶ 7 (“Kabacoff submitted a comprehensive parental capacity evaluation that found, among
other things, that Malenko was not mentally ill. Kabacoff also noted that Handrahan's efforts to have
Malenko diagnosed with a mental illness had led several providers to suggest that Handrahan herself seek
mental health counseling.”).
90. Id. ¶ 16.
91. Id. ¶¶ 11-12.
92. Id. ¶ 12.
93. Id. ¶ 13.
94. Id.
95. Id. The report also noted that such a move would be unduly disruptive to a young child anyway.
See, e.g., Janet M. Bowermaster, Sympathizing with Solomon: Choosing Between Parents in A Mobile
Society, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 791, 799-800 (1992).
96. Malenko, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 16, 979 A.2d 1269.
97. The pertinent paragraph is included in its entirety:
B. Primary physical residence. Primary physical residence of [the daughter] is allocated to
[Handrahan]. There was some indication made at trial that [Handrahan] may intend to
relocate to the Washington, D.C. area in a job-related move. The court finds that it is in the
best interest of [the daughter] that she has frequent and continuing contact with both of her
parents. Therefore, primary physical residence of [the daughter] is allocated to [Handrahan]
provided she remains in the State of Maine. If [Handrahan] does in fact relocate out of
state, primary physical residence of [the daughter] shall be granted to [Malenko].
Malenko, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 16, 979 A.2d 1269.
98. Id. ¶ 20. Handrahan listed two other grounds for her appeal: (1) that the court erred in excluding
the telephonic testimony of two of her expert witnesses, and (2) that the court’s credibility findings were
erroneous. Id. In keeping with the particularly broad grant of discretion the Law Court has described in
family law appeals, the Court found no error and substantively affirmed the judgment. Id. ¶¶ 33, 41.
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in Part II of this Note.99
The Law Court found Handrahan’s challenges moot, and therefore
nonjusticiable.100 The court also noted its hesitancy to further prolong a highly
contested matter by issuing a remand.101 Any further modifications would force the
parties back into mediation, though the court noted that, “[t]he prospect of a mediated
resolution in this case may prove to be no more than wishful judicial thinking.”102
The moot provision was struck and the judgment otherwise affirmed.103
B. The Case for Discretion and Best Interest Revisited
A notable aspect of the Rowland cases and Malenko is the reaffirmation of
deference to the trial court’s findings of fact.104 The “abuse of discretion” standard
for reversing the judgment of the trial court is particularly strict for determinations
of parental rights and responsibilities.105 In Malenko the District Court found, as a
factual matter, that the best interest of the child could only be served by the
conditional grant of residency ordered in the Provision.106 This pattern continued in
Light, when the Law Court again deferred to the District Court’s findings regarding
the best interest of the child.107
Deference to the factual findings of the District Court is important because it
provides the foundation on which the Law Court based its favorable discussion of
99. Malenko, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 20, 979 A.2d 1269 (“Handrahan . . . asserts that the relocation provision
is unconstitutional because it infringes on her right to travel [and] right to family integrity. . . .”); see supra
Part II.
100. “Based on Malenko's concession [that the provision is no longer effective], we modify the
judgment by striking the automatic relocation provision from the judgment, and, as modified, affirm the
court's award of shared parental rights and responsibilities, with primary residential care to Handrahan
and rights of parental contact to Malenko.” Malenko, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 29, 979 A.2d 1269. This is an
identical situation to Light, and was the basis for the argument raised by the concurrence in that case.
101. Id. ¶ 28.
102. Id.; see also 19-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1653, 1657 (2012). As it turned out, the Court’s thinking was
wishful indeed. The parties were back before the Law Court in 2011, when Handrahan appealed the denial
of a protection from abuse she had filed on behalf of their daughter based on an allegation that Malenko
had sexually abused the daughter. Handrahan v. Malenko, 2011 ME 15, ¶ 2, 12 A.3d 79.
103. Malenko, 2009 ME 96, ¶¶ 29, 41. 979 A.2d 1269
104. Rowland I, 629 A.2d 613, 616-17 (Me. 1993). “Based on the record before us and the best
interests considerations mandated in [19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(3)], we cannot say that the trial court's
findings are clearly erroneous or that its amendment of the divorce judgment as it relates to the primary
physical residence of the children constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Cf. Malenko, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 23,
979 A.2d 1269 (“[T]he provision [in Rowland I] was not an abuse of discretion because the court was
presented with ample evidence establishing that the imminent relocation did not serve the children's
current best interests.”).
105. “We have recently stated that “[i]n connection with both the original divorce judgment and any
motions for a change of the primary physical residence [of minor children] ‘the sensitive questions relating
to the upbringing of minor children of divorced parents must of necessity be committed to the sound
judgment of the trial [court that] hears the witnesses who describe the relevant circumstances of the case.’
The court must ‘discern, as a wise, affectionate and careful parent,’ what custody arrangements will further
the child's best interest.” Rowland II, 1997 ME 80, ¶ 7, 692 A.2d 939 (citing Cloutier v. Lear, 1997 ME
35, ¶ 4, 691 A.2d 660.).
106. Malenko, 2009 ME 134, ¶¶ 13-15, 979 A.2d 1269.
107. Light v. D’Amato, 2014 ME 134, ¶¶ 23, 24, 105 A.3d 447. Indeed, D’Amato’s other ground for
appeal was a denied motion to reopen the evidence, which the Law Court likewise affirmed, finding no
abuse of discretion. Id. ¶ 29.
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the court order in each case. The Law Court upheld the conditional grant of residency
when reviewing it only for consistency with the best interest of the child,108 and
commented favorably on the District Court’s efforts to find a solution consistent with
the best interest of the child.109 This signaled to family courts the significance of the
best interest of the child,110 and the Law Court’s general deference to the trial court’s
factual findings.
In the two-paragraph discussion of the constitutionality and statutory validity
of the conditional grant of residency in Malenko, the Law Court would have resolved
the statutory question with one sentence, but for it being dictum: “[A] provision for
the automatic transfer of a child’s primary residence does not violate statutory
requirements if it is responsive to an imminent relocation and is supported by a
current assessment of the child’s best interests.”111 The Law Court has sent a strong
signal that statutory challenges to grants of residency conditioned on a parent’s
relocation will be unlikely to prevail. In other words, such provisions are not a per
se violation of title 19-A, section 1653 of the Maine Revised Statutes.112 The Law
Court’s treatment of the constitutional issue in Malenko was more ambiguous.113
The court reached the constitutional implications of a conditional grant of
residency for the first time in Light, holding that there was no constraint on
D’Amato’s right to travel.114 The benefit of this holding is simplicity. Where there
is no constraint of a fundamental right, there is no need for balancing or a compelling
state interest sufficient to outweigh the right. However, simply holding that there is
no constraint on a residential parent’s right to relocate risks over-simplifying a
parent’s decision-making process. The trial court’s order does not affect D’Amato’s
decision-making; it effectively makes the decision for her.115 D’Amato’s desire to
return to Italy was certainly strong, but regardless of how compelling her reasons,
she would be faced with a painful, difficult choice with lifelong consequences: The
cost would be to give up primary residency of her child, whom she had been living
with, nurturing, and loving for her entire life, and as primary residential parent for
over a year.116
Furthermore, the holding may have constitutional implications as well because
108. Rowland I at 616-17.
109. Id. at 617. See also Malenko, 2009 ME 134, ¶ 28.
110. Although, under Light, apparently not of controlling importance.
111. Malenko, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 23, 979 A.2d 1269. See also Stacey-Sotiriou v. Sotiriou, 2014 ME 145,
¶ 15, 106 A.3d 417 (emphasis added) (writing that the court must consider both “the present circumstances
and the future needs” of the minor child).
112. Malenko, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 23, 979 A.2d 1269.
113. Id. ¶ 24. The Law Court cites to a Colorado Supreme Court case which includes a summary of
some of the potential solutions considered in Parts II, B and C of this Note. In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113
P.3d 135, 143-47 (Colo. 2005). Notably, the Court’s dicta on the treatment of parental relocation focuses
more on the impact it will have on the other parent’s rights than the relocating parent’s right to relocate.
Id.
114. See Light v. D’Amato, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 19, 105 A.3d 447. Maine is not the only state to hold that
prohibitions on a primary residential parent’s right to relocate with her child does not constrain her right
to travel. See Carlson v. Carlson, 661 P.2d 833, 836 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that mother’s right to
establish residence elsewhere was limited only by her desire to maintain primary residency with her child).
115. See Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 333 (Tenn. 1993) (“[The lower court’s holding] presented
[the child’s] mother with a veritable Hobson’s choice . . . .”).
116. See Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶¶ 2, 8, 105 A.3d 447.
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it ignores the constitutionally protected right to familial privacy and autonomy.117
Future grants of residency conditioned on parental relocation could still be appealed
on these grounds. The trial court must not only force the parent to make a decision
of extreme personal and emotional importance, but also to make a decision that will
have far-reaching and fundamental effects on her family. This cannot be the end of
the analysis. The effect of such an order on the family’s privacy and autonomy cannot
be sidestepped simply because the parent’s right to travel has not been technically
constrained.
Perhaps recognizing these concerns, the Law Court provides a follow-up
argument: assuming arguendo that the provision constrained D’Amato’s right to
travel, such a constraint would be proper because “the [District Court] appropriately
considered and balanced the various fundamental or constitutionally protected
interests at stake in reaching its decision.”118 The court frames the balancing test as
“between ‘a custodial parent’s right to engage in interstate travel and to decide where
the parent and child will reside, and a non-custodial parent’s right to have continuing
and meaningful parent/child contact with the child.’”119
As noted above, this balancing test does not provide significant value to a
meaningful analysis: this is because both rights to be balanced are fundamental and
constitutionally protected.120 The Law Court provides more guidance by reframing
the balancing test as requiring “full consideration of the child’s best interest,”
prefacing its discussion of the District Court’s findings relating to the best interest of
the child.121 Indeed, despite references to a more comprehensive balancing test, the
grounds on which the Law Court affirms the Provision rest entirely on findings
relating to the best interest of the child.122
V. CONCLUSION
The Law Court reached the right result in Light, but not for the best reason.
Holding that the constraint of a parent’s right to travel with his or her child is not at
all a constraint on his or her comprehensive right to travel is somewhat artificial.
Regardless of how compelling a parent’s reason for relocating may be, forcing that
parent to choose between leaving—thereby losing primary residency—or staying in
117. See generally, Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
118. Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 20, 105 A.3d 447.
119. Id. (citing Malenko v. Handrahan, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 24, 979 A.2d 1269). In a separate footnote, the
Law Court explicitly rejects “protecting the welfare of children” as “providing the required justification”
to constrain a parent’s right to travel, instead adopting the “balancing approach,” “balancing the needs of
the child against the rights of the parents.” Id. n.1, (citing In re Marriage of Fedorov, 206 P.3d 1124, 1134
(Or. Ct. App. 2009); Malenko, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 24, 979 A.2d 1269).
120. See PRINCIPLES § 2.17, cmt. a at 402 (2002) (“The ability to change one's area of residence is an
important individual right. So is having access to one's child. When two parents have been exercising
continuing care and responsibility for a child, the relocation of one of them puts these two interests in
sometimes irreconcilable conflict.”).
121. Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶¶ 22-24, 105 A.3d 447.
122. See id. ¶ 24 (“Given the factual record; the court's determination that the child's best interest is
served by having continued, regular contact with both parents; and the court's finding that Light is more
likely to foster contact with the other parent in the event of geographic separation, the court's judgment
does not violate the balance of the parents' and the child's constitutional and fundamental rights.”).
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order to retain residency is to give that parent no choice at all. This is a true Hobson’s
Choice.123
The Law Court may have recognized these potential concerns, and as such in
dicta has explained that even if there were a constraint on D’Amato’s right to travel
to Italy, this collateral effect was balanced by other fundamental or constitutionally
protected interests.124 However, these “other interests” eventually boil down to one
pivotal standard: The best interest of the child. No one parent’s interest in raising his
or her child trumps the other, and by statute, Maine courts must order arrangements
that allow for continuing contact with both parents, provided such an arrangement is
in the best interests of the child.125 Functionally, in each case where the trial court
has considered a grant of residency conditioned on the residential parent’s remaining
in the state, the Law Court has considered the best interest of the child in upholding
such a provision.126 The Law Court can simplify the standard by recognizing the
best interest of the child as a compelling state interest sufficient to overcome a
parent’s fundamental right to travel and relocate. In Light, the result would be the
same with such a standard, but the Law Court would instead have relied on the trial
court’s factual finding that the residential arrangement in the order was consistent
with the best interest of the child.127 Recognizing that protecting the child’s best
interest is a compelling state interest would empower the trial court to uphold the
conditional grant of residency despite D’Amato’s fundamental right to relocate,
rather than holding that this right was not at all constrained.128
The current approach in Maine fails to recognize that for most residential
parents, a prohibition on relocating with their child will be a functional, if not
technical, constraint on their decision to relocate. The follow-up argument suggests
that a balancing test of the “various fundamental or constitutionally protected
interests” would resolve the issue even if a parent’s right to travel were
constrained.129 Yet, because the only other fundamental rights implicated are a
parent’s right to raise his child and a general right to family autonomy and privacy,
such a balancing test becomes indistinguishable from merely holding that the
outcome is in the best interest of the child. Holding the best interest of the child as
123. See Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 333 (Tenn. 1993). Such a holding may also have
constitutional implications for a parent’s right to family autonomy. See cases cited supra note 117 and
accompanying text.
124. Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 20, 105 A.3d 447
125. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653(1)(C) (2012).
126. See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1653 (2012 & Supp. 2015); see also Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 22, 105 A.3d
447; Malenko v. Handrahan, 2009 ME 96, ¶ 23, 979 A.2d 1269; Rowland I, 629 A.2d 613, 616-17 (Me.
1993). In Malenko, the provision was struck, but only for mootness. Malenko, 2009 ME 96, ¶¶ 27-28,
979 A.2d 1269. In its analysis, the Law Court was still supportive of the District Court’s findings that the
provision was in the best interest of the child. Id.
127. See, e.g., Lachapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 163 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). The Court of
Appeals of Minnesota recognized that a young girl’s mother had a fundamental right to relocate, but its
holding was still beautifully simple: “The deprivation of fundamental rights is subject to strict scrutiny
and may only be upheld if justified by a compelling state interest. The compelling state interest in this
case is the protection of the best interests of the child.”
128. See Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 19, 105 A.3d 447. For an analogous result in another jurisdiction, see
In re Custody of D.M.G and T.J.G., 951 P.2d 1377, 1383 (Mont. 1998) (requiring that the party requesting
a travel restriction provide sufficient evidence that such a restriction be in the best interest of the child).
129. See Light, 2014 ME 134, ¶ 20, 105 A.3d 447.
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a compelling government interest would recognize this reality. Such a standard
would have supported the same result in Rowland I and Malenko, where the district
courts found the conditional grants of residency to be consistent with the best interest
of the child, and the Law Court upheld such findings.130 This standard has provided
consistent results in analogous cases in other jurisdictions.131
While the Law Court reached the right result in Light, it should have gone further
and recognized that protecting the best interest of the child is a compelling interest.
Divorce will always present challenges for the children affected, but family law
courts can endeavor to mitigate these challenges by making the interest of the
affected children determinative in deciding issues with a bearing on their livelihood.

130. See Rowland I, 629 A.2d 613 at 615.
131. See, e.g., LaChapelle, 607 N.W.2d at 163 (holding that the best interest of the child is a
compelling interest sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny); In re Custody of D.M.G., 951 P.2d 1377, 1381
(holding that constitutional right to interstate travel is “qualified” by the best interests of the child); Clark
v. Atkins, 489 N.E.2d 90, 100 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (recognizing protecting the interests of children as a
compelling objective).

